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The paper takes up Bell's (1987) “Everett (?) theory” and develops it further. The resulting theory is about the
system of all particles in the universe, each located in ordinary, 3-dimensional space. This many-particle system as
a whole performs random jumps through 3N-dimensional configuration space – hence “Tychistic Bohmian Me-
chanics” (TBM). The distribution of its spontaneous localisations in configuration space is given by the Born Rule
probability measure for the universal wavefunction. Contra Bell, the theory is argued to satisfy the minimal
desiderata for a Bohmian theory within the Primitive Ontology framework (for which we offer a metaphysically
more perspicuous formulation than is customary). TBM's formalism is that of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics (BM),
without the postulate of continuous particle trajectories and their deterministic dynamics. This “rump formalism”
receives, however, a different interpretation. We defend TBM as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum
theory. Objections voiced by Bell and Maudlin are rebutted. The “for all practical purposes”-classical, Everettian
worlds (i.e. quasi-classical histories) exist sequentially in TBM (rather than simultaneously, as in the Everett
interpretation). In a temporally coarse-grained sense, they quasi-persist. By contrast, the individual particles
themselves cease to persist.1. Introduction
The present paper advances a “minimally” Bohmian theory – Tych-
istic1 Bohmian Mechanics (TBM) – as both empirically and meta-
physically adequate. It is minimally Bohmian in two senses. First, it
satisfies a plausible minimum of desiderata for a theory to qualify as
Bohmian; secondly, it uses only a minimum of assumptions on which the
predictive success of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics (BM) rests – BM's
“working posits”.2 Metaphysically, its key novelty consists in a distinctive
combination of fundamental stochasticity, its many-worlds ontology, and
Bohmicity (i.e. it belongs to the class of Bohmian quantum theories).3
In a nutshell, TBM retains BM's overarching ontological framework.
Its referents are particles, located in ordinary 3-dimensional space. Their
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jectories: according to TBM, the universe – understood as an N-particle
system as a whole – performs fundamentally stochastic jumps through
configuration space. Rather than co-existing simultaneously as in the
Everett interpretation, different worlds pop into existence sequentially: by
hopping through configuration space, the universe instantiates (actual-
ises) those structures in the wavefunction of the universe which corre-
spond to Everettian worlds (i.e. quasi-classical histories, warranted by
decoherence), see Fig. 1. The probability for those spontaneous mate-
rialisations is given by the Born Rule for the wavefunction of the
universe.
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Fig. 1. The figure illustrates three points: 1. The N-corpuscle system (or the "totality of corpuscles", TOC) carves out (almost surely) the universal wavefunction. 2.
Space is densely filled with many-worlds sequentially popping into existence. The corpuscles form a quasi-plenum. 3. On a temporally coarse-grained level, the FAPP-
worlds quasi-persist.
P.M. Duerr, A. Ehmann Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 90 (2021) 168–183literature has largely concurred with the arguments Bell gestures at. In
consequence, the theory received only marginal attention. We are un-
happy with several of the received arguments in that discussion.
Accordingly, our present paper pursues four goals:
(1) To provide a more perspicuous formulation of the theory – TBM.
(2) To re-appraise the extant criticism of its central idea, in particular
by Bell and Maudlin.
(3) To argue that TBM is a close cognate of BM – what is left of BM,
once one shears the latter of all dispensable elements (and re-
adjusts the interpretation of one of its remaining postulates) –
rather than a reading of the Everett interpretation.
(4) To outline TBM's salient metaphysical features.
Our present aim isn't to advocate TBM as necessarily superior to BM
(nor to the Everett interpretation). That would require a circumspect
evaluation of all of their respective shortcomings and advantages. In
particular, we don't argue that TBM scores necessarily better in terms of
parsimony. Such claims call for a separate analysis – one that must pay
attention to different forms of parsimony/simplicity exemplified in the
theories in question (and how they are supposed to trade off against each
other – if one wants to regard them as truth-indicative criteria for theory
selection at all). Here, we rest content with demonstrating that TBM is an
empirically adequate and coherent theory. As such, it deserves a place at
the table of the current discussions. Like standard BM, it falls within the
framework of so-called Primitive Ontology (see x3.4 for details). Thus,
TBM circumvents criticism of those who insist on compliance with that169framework as a metaphysical sine qua non for any theory. Insofar as in
what follows we compare TBM and other theories, it solely serves the
purposes of clarification, in particular by demarcating TBM from those
other theories.
The paper proceeds as follows. In §2 we review BM, recapitulating its
motivation, formulation and standard interpretation. In §3 we introduce
and develop TBM. §3.1. argues that an investigation of TBM is
rewarding, even if one rejects it in favour of BM. §3.2 elucidates TBM's
principles and interpretation. We demonstrate its empirical adequacy.
§3.3. sketches the role of probabilities in TBM, and their possible in-
terpretations. In §3.4., we argue that TBM counts as a Bohmian theory,
distinct from the Everett interpretation. We next turn to TBM's salient
metaphysical features. §3.5. critically re-evaluates Bell and Maudlin's
reasons for rejecting TBM. In elaborating further its many-worlds char-
acter, we show TBM to be coherent. We summarise our findings in §4.
2. Review of Bohmian Mechanics
This section outlines the motivation, basic postulates and received
interpretation of standard BM. It's a theory about particles with deter-
minate, deterministic trajectories, whose dynamics is constructed from
the wavefunction.
Vis-a-vis the strife over the foundations of QM, especially the mea-
surement problem, the interpretation of the Heisenberg relations and
their joint culmination in the EPR “paradox”, the question arises whether
QM in its orthodox form (e.g. Von Neumann, 1932) is incomplete: might
there exist an element of physical reality that has no counterpart in the
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Redhead (1987), p.71, who also discusses the EPR argument in detail)?
Einstein (1949, p. 666), for instance, was “[…] firmly convinced that the
essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely
to be ascribed to the fact that this [theory] operates with an incomplete
description of physical systems.”
BM is an attempt to complete QM (if only in the sense of supplying the
latter with a clear ontology). It offers a deterministic account of a
corpuscular sub-quantum reality. From it, QM emerges in some sense, in
a manner “approximately analogous […] to the statistical mechanics
within the framework of classical mechanics” (ibid.).
From a non-historical perspective, BM is primarily motivated by the
desire for a thoroughly ontic interpretation of QM – a “quantum theory
without observer” (see e.g. Bell, 1990, p. 215; Allori et al., 2008, sect. 4):
it's about objective matters of fact, rather than subjective or epistemic
states of experimenters. Such a form of realism had come under attack
with influential anti-realist presentations of QM (for historical accounts,
see e.g. Howard, 2004; Scheibe, 2007, Ch. VIII; Oldofredi & Esfeld,
2018).
BM is a non-relativistic theory about N (massive, charged, etc.) par-
ticles and their continuous spatiotemporal evolution in 3-dimensional
space. Their dynamics is such that the empirical content of QM, as
enshrined in the Born Rule, remains unaltered.
Within a realist setting, BM thereby achieves its goal to provide a
solution to the measurement problem (cf. Dürr &Teufel, 2009, p. 177;
Esfeld, 2019; Lazarovici, 2019; Maudlin, 1995a). The latter consists in
the incompatibility of the following three propositions (see e.g. Maudlin,
1995b):
(A) The wavefunction of a quantum-mechanical system is complete: It
specifies (directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a
system.
(B) The wavefunction evolves unitarily (in accord with e.g. the
Schr€odinger Equation).
(C) Measurements, such as of an electron's spin, always have deter-
minate outcomes (represented by the corresponding eigenstates):
After a measurement, the measurement device is in a(n eigen)state
either indicating spin-up or spin down. Superpositions aren't
recorded.
While any two of these propositions are consistent with each other,
their conjunction isn't. Schr€odinger's famous cat paradox illustrates this.
Assume that a cat's state is completely described by the wavefunction.
Then, the QM formalism implies that at some point it's no longer in a
determinate state of either dead or alive: the cat will be smeared out in a
superposition of life and death. This seems to flout experience.5 We borrow this terminology from Dewdney and Brown (e.g. Dewdney &
Brown, 1995 or Brown, Elby, & Weingard, 1996). Thereby, we hope to alert to –
albeit perhaps not necessarily compelling – subtleties for identifying the Boh-
mian “primitive stuff” with classical particles. Two salient features of the latter
have been discerned (cf. Mittelstaedt, 1995; Falkenburg, 2007, Ch. 6.1):
(INDEP): (a) They may be in non-interacting, uncoupled states. (b) Their initial
conditions are statistically uncorrelated.(COMP): A “law of thorough-going
determination” (Mittelstaedt) holds: For every property, we can predicate
either it or its negation of the particle. Bohmian particles flat-out flout (INDEP).
Qua BM's non-locality, they don't seem to conform to (a). Nor do they respect
(b): the quantum equilibrium hypothesis (viewed as a kind of law-like statement
as part of the orthodox Bohmian-package deal) imposes a statistical constraint
on initial conditions; they must be distributed approximately in accordance with
the (QEH). Due to the Bohmian particles' contextuality, (COMP) is also plausibly
violated: according to DGZ's interpretation of the contextual variables, these
don't represent properties of the system/the corpuscles; in particular, one can't
meaningfully ascribe, say, angular momentum to particles – in contradiction to
what “thorough-going determination” would demand.Sincere thanks to an
anonymous referee for pressing us on this!
170BM eschews the dilemma by contesting (A): for a complete description
of a system's state, its wavefunction must be supplemented by the posi-
tions the system's constituent particles occupy. (To distinguish the Boh-
mian particles from classical ones, we'll hereafter refer to them as
“corpuscles”.5).
More precisely, for a universe with N corpuscles of mass mi each,6
standard BM comprises three postulates (cf. Bohm & Hiley, 1993;
Holland, 1993; Dürr & Teufel, 2009; Passon, 2010; Tumulka, 2017;
Goldstein, 2017 for detailed reviews):






with the universal wavefunction (i.e. the wavefunction of the universe)
Ψt : R3N  R → C, the (ordered) configuration Q :¼ ðQ1;…;QNÞ 2 R3N





VðQ; tÞ with ri ¼ ∂∂Qi, i ¼ 1;…; N acting on the i-th particle. (For con-
venience, we'll subsequently suppress the wavefunction's time-index.)





It supplies the dynamics for each (i ¼ 1; …; N) corpuscle. Note that
the expression on the r.h.s. depends on the configuration of all particles.
(This renders BM's non-locality manifest.)
Given initial positions of the corpuscles, the GE determines their
positions at any other time. Existence and uniqueness of the trajectories
are guaranteed under prima facie reasonable assumptions. Note that the
corpuscles’ velocity fields generated by the GE depend on the wave-
function: Vi :¼ dQidt ¼ VΨi .
(3) The Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis (QEH):
Let Ψ denote the wavefunction of the universe. Via its associated
(Born) measure jΨj2; it (uniquely7) induces a measure of typicality: It
quantifies which (measurable) sets of corpuscle configurations Q⊆R3N
count as large (“typical”), i.e.
R
Q
d3NQjΨðQÞj2 ¼ 1 ε, for some small ε.8
(This definition of typicality is time-independent in a suitably generalised
sense (“equivariant”), see Dürr et al. (1992), sect. 7.)
Given this typicality measure, one can then show that for ensembles
of identically prepared subsystems of the universe, each with the wave-
function ψ , the corpuscles' configurations are typically distributed ac-
cording to the Born Rule, ρ ¼ jψ j2 (ibid.; Goldstein, 2011, p. 4.4). That is:
for typical, large ensembles, the Born Rule approximates the corpuscles'
empirical distribution, ρempðQÞ :¼ 1N
PN
i¼1
δðQ  bqiÞ, with
bq :¼ ð0;…; 0; qi; 0;…; 0Þ 2 ℝ3N ,where qi 2 R3 denotes the i-th corpuscle's
actual position: ρempðQÞ  jψ tðQÞj2. (This forges the link between BM's6 Ascribing the masses to the corpuscles alone isn't uncontroversial, cf. Dew-
dney & Brown (1995); Brown (1996a). Esfeld (2018, p. 170) denies that cor-
puscles possess any intrinsic mass or charge (or any intrinsic properties).
However, the interference phenomena Esfeld cites don't unequivocally support
that (cf. Brown et al., 1996, sect. 4).
7 More precisely: jΨj2 is the unique, natural measure that is equivariant under
the dynamics defined by the GE, see Goldstein & Struyve (2007).
8 For more on the typicality interpretation of the QEH, see Maudlin (2011);
Goldstein (2011); Lazarovici & Reichert (2015); cf. Frigg (2009, 2011) or Val-
entini (2020) for a critical voice.
10 One particularly intriguing issue is: Is it possible to derive the Born Rule in a
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finite number of position measurements, performed in the universe's
life-time on identically prepared systems with wavefunction ψ . The spe-
cific positions of those systems' corpuscles vary. But at a statistical level,
their distribution is well approximated by the density jψ t j2 : in almost all
measurements, the corpuscles are roughly distributed by jψ t j2. In the
absence of any further, i.e. more fine-grained information (information
that given contemporary QM isn't available to us in principle), we may –
according to advocates of the typicality interpretation – treat our
observational-empirical data as typical, see e.g. Dürr & Struyve, 2019.)
For extensions of BM to incorporate spin or external electromagnetic
fields, we refer the reader to the literature (e.g. Holland, 1993, Ch. 9, 10;
Norsen, 2014).
A comment on BM's ideology (in the sense of Quine) is in order: what,
according to BM, are the corpuscles' properties and relations (besides
their mass, charge and magnetic momentum)? All dynamical variables –
momentum, energy, spin, etc. – other than position, are contextual: their
values depend on which other variables are assigned definite values.
Position is the only non-contextual variable: only the corpuscles' posi-
tions (and their time-derivatives, i.e. velocities) always possess a sharp
value. (Thus, BM evades the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem for hidden
variable theories, see e.g. Redhead, 1989, Ch. 5, 6; Held, 2018 for de-
tails.) Ontologically, therefore momentum, energy, spin, etc. are sub-
sidiary, non-fundamental quantities: in BM, they are non-classical
degrees of freedom9 that merely codify (supervene on) the corpuscles'
motion (for details, see Daumer et al., 1997; Esfeld et al., 2014; Lazar-
ovici et al.. 2018, sect.5).
For the present purposes, we set aside the thorny issue of the status of
the wavefunction in BM (cf., for instance, Esfeld et al., 2014). Suffice it to
state the dilemma one faces. On the one hand, the quantum state – the
putative entity to which the wavefunction refers (Maudlin, 2013) – ap-
pears real at least in two regards. First, the wavefunction enters the QEH
– and in this (at least, purely mathematical) sense constrains the cor-
puscles' distribution; secondly, it also enters the GE – and in this (at least,
purely mathematical) sense determines their dynamics. Vis-a-vis these
observations, Bell (1987, p. 128) judged: “Nobody can understand this
theory, until he is willing to think of ψ as a real, objective field – rather
than just a probability amplitude.” On the other hand, as Bell likewise
stresses, the wavefunction is defined on 3N-dimensional configuration
space. At first blush, it's unclear how to understand such an entity
inhabiting this space. It's even more mysterious how it relates to and is
supposed to affect the particles, inhabiting our familiar 3-dimensional
space (for a survey of possible responses, see the contributions in Ney
& Albert, 2013). We'll return to this dilemma in x3.2.
In summary: BM provides an objective account of the world, made up
of point-like corpuscles. Their only dynamical variables are positions. At
all times, their positions are determinate. Via the wavefunction, a dy-
namics is defined that guides the corpuscles' deterministic spatiotem-
poral evolution. A universal constraint on the corpuscles’ initial
distribution secures empirical equivalence with QM.
This provides the background against which we'll now elaborate a
cousin of BM.
3. Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics
This section introduces and unpacks TBM – the theory that naturally
emerges upon removing the GE from BM (with suitable interpretational
re-adjustments).9
“Degree of freedom” here shouldn't be understood traditionally, as repre-
senting a system's properties. Mindful of Dürr et al.'s warnings of “naïve realism
about operators”, we use the term in a purely formal-mathematical sense,
denoting the parameters that need to be specified for a full description of the
system and its behaviour. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on
this.
171TBM can be considered the “rump Bohmian theory” of randomly
materializing corpuscles which one obtains after jettisoning BM's GE
(and the concomitant determinism) – together with a re-
interpretation of the QEH as a stochastic guidance law (rather than
a typicality statement, as in BM). The corpuscles are no longer
assigned continuous trajectories. But their positions remain deter-
minate at all times. With the probability equal to the Born Rule, the
N-corpuscle system as a whole localizes itself in a fundamentally
stochastic process: it performs random jumps through configuration
space. Can TBM deliver a coherent picture of the world? We'll answer
this in the affirmative.
We'll first (3.1.) say why it's worthwhile inspecting this theory. In 3.2,
we'll clarify TBM's conceptual basis and defend TBM's empirical ade-
quacy. 3.3. discusses possible interpretations of its probabilities. In 3.4.,
we categorise TBM as a minimally Bohmian theory. Subsequently, we
elaborate on TBM's metaphysical and epistemological adequacy: 3.5. re-
evaluates Bell's criticism of TBM as “solipsistic” by illuminating its many-
worlds character.3.1. Motivation
Let's first spell out the motivation of (and the intention behind) our
discussion of TBM: why consider removing the GE – even if one considers
BM perfectly acceptable?
In light of BM's three postulates, two questions arise: are they logi-
cally independent? Are all of them strictly necessary?10 Here, we wish to
remain conservative with respect to the established physics. That is, we
want to retain as few of BM's postulates as possible, whilst keeping its
spirit intact. We'll probe a different question: can the GE be excised from
BM, whilst forfeiting neither empirical and metaphysical viability nor, to
a reasonable extent, BM's spirit?
Such an inquiry will not only deepen our understanding of BM along
two lines. It's also one prima facie plausible reaction to the empirical
underdetermination of BM's dynamics.
First, imagine a reader who endorses BM in its current form. She
should welcome the envisaged study. To fully appreciate BM's merits, one
needs to understand the import of each of its postulates – in particular
that of the GE. A crucial question then is: what (metaphysical) conse-
quences ensue if one abandons it? Our understanding of scientific the-
ories is considerably deepened by systematically exploring such
modifications (including omissions of some) of their axioms/postulates
(cf. Lehmkuhl, 2017).
But the project is also of interest to those disconcerted by one of BM's
features: the GE is vastly underdetermined by any possible observational
data. An infinitude of equally viable, empirically equivalent alternative
dynamics – different forms of the GE – exist. Each generates distinct tra-
jectories (Deotto & Ghirardi, 2002; Holland & Philippidis, 2003). In
principle – and by construction – it's impossible to experimentally
discriminate between those options.
Such empirical under-determination obstructs a naïve realism about
BM (Kukla, 1994, p. 157; cf.; Stanford, 2017): why assume one particular
particle dynamics – say, the standard GE – rather than another, equally
suitable alternative? Advocates of BM have responded that the standard
GE is distinguished as the simplest choice for a dynamics (Dürr, Gold-
stein, & Zanghì, 1992, p. 852) that respect certain desiderata.11manner analogous to Boltzmann's H-Theorem? That is: Do the configurations of
most subsystems relax – via the corpuscle dynamics – into a “quantum equi-
librium”, i.e. the distributionjψ t j2? We'll not pursue further such questions (see,
however, Valentini & Westman, 2005; cf. Callender & Weingard, 1997; Call-
ender, 2007).
11 Dürr et al. demand that the guidance law to be constructed be a first order
differential equation, homogeneous (of degree zero) as a function of the
wavefunction, Galilei-invariant and invariant under time-reversal.
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natural desiderata turn out to be tenuous (Belot, 2010; Fankhauser &
Dürr, 2021 x2.2). Moreover, suppose, for the sake of the argument, that
they were compelling. Yet, the argument still isn't entirely convincing: it
pivotally turns on mathematical simplicity – that is, simplicity of the
mathematical form of the dynamics. The infinitely many variants of BM
with alternative guidance equations that differ from standard BM's only
by a divergence-free term (cf. Fankhauser & Dürr, 2021) don't differ in
their ontology. Hence, mathematical simplicity here doesn't even imply
differences with respect to ontological parsimony. But why deem math-
ematical simplicity12 – rather than a pragmatic criterion or even a sub-
jective, rather elusive aesthetic preference – a reliable guide to truth? To
do so is controversial (see e.g. van Fraassen, 1980, esp. Ch. 4.4; Ivanova,
2014) – already on inductive grounds (cf. Hossenfelder, 2018; Norton,
2018). Dürr et al.‘s reliance on simplicity thus considerably detracts from
their argument's force. More generally, vis-a-vis the coexistence of
empirically equivalent theories one may, of course, always invoke
super-empirical criteria for theory selection. The challenge for an advo-
cate of such a strategy then is: how to justify this choice of
super-empirical criteria – and, in particular, why believe that they track
truth?
Empirically equivalent, genuinely distinct theories are in fact rare
(Norton, 2008). This raises a double worry: are they merely notational
variants of the same theory, or does (at least) one of them posit su-
perfluous structure? The former case is exemplified by the duality be-
tween Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and Schr€odinger's wave
mechanics (for caveats, see Muller, 1997a; 1997b). Germane for us is
the latter case: could it be that all variants of BM share a common core –
and that we should only be realists about this common core (cf. Le
Bihan & Read, 2018)? Different variants of BM13 differ primarily over
the (in principle undetectable) corpuscle trajectories. It's therefore
natural to contemplate whether one can dispense with them altogether.
This would in some sense attenuate the challenge of under-
determination: it would efface the postulated key differences between
different versions of BM as illusory.
Our study of TBM explores the viability of such a “‘common core’-
strategy” (Le Bihan& Read) in the case of BM: it would require, of course,
that the “common core”-theory be both empirically adequate, and that it
admit of a coherent interpretation. This we affirm. Thereby, TBM is
shown to be a prima facie serious rival to BM vis-a-vis the latter's
empirical underdetermination.14
In fact, selective realism – a cautious form of realism that has emerged
from detailed analyses of historical challenges (see e.g. Kitcher, 1995;
Psillos, 1999, esp. Ch. 5&6; Vickers, 2017, 2018, 2019) – suggests that
our realist commitment is only warranted towards the “working posits”
of successful theories, i.e. those parts indispensable for their predictive
and explanatory success. The remaining “idle posits” don't merit realist12 It deserves to be pointed out that there are other forms of simplicity, not
necessarily compatible with mathematical simplicity (Bunge, 1963). Even if one
believes in simplicity as a guide to truth, it's far from clear that mathematical
simplicity – however that term may be made precise or objective (in particular:
objective in the sense of formalism/representation-independent!) – is the rele-
vant form of simplicity (cf. also Barrett 1999, p. 156 on different types of
simplicity).
13 We'll not be concerned with Bohm's original quantum potential theory
(championed also by Holland, 1993). Due to the latter's ontological differences,
we deem it a theory distinct from the first-order theories under consideration.
To these we'll refer as “variants of BM”.
14 This isn't to deny, of course, the existence of other serious rival theories: they
likewise constitute prima facie plausible reactions to BM's underdetermination.
Goldstein's Identity-Based Bohmian Mechanics is a particularly interesting such
alternative, due to its qualitative parsimony in the sense of Lewis (1973, pp. 87).
In the present paper, we refrain from any further evaluation of – let alone
arbitration between – those empirically equivalent theories along their super-
empirical virtues.
172commitment. If – as we maintain – TBM is empirically adequate and
metaphysically coherent, it's conceivable that the GE counts as an “idle
posit”. In that case, following the selective realist's suggestion, realism
about the GE – and by implication, BM in its entirety – wouldn't be
justified.
We refrain, however, from any verdict as to whether TBM is indeed
superior to BM. Only a detailed comparison of all of its explanatory suc-
cesses (and, arguably, super-empirical virtues) can decide this. Here, we
merely provide a proof of principle: to discard TBM in favour of BM calls
for non-trivial arguments.
In sum: Irrespective of parsimony considerations that might
commend the resulting theory, exploring whether one can still make
sense of the formalism of BMwithout the GE promises to shed light on the
latter's function, both physical and metaphysical.
With this prospective pay-off in mind, let's now plunge into the the-
ory. To maintain TBM's adequacy, we'll rectify two misapprehensions
about it that have impeded a wider consideration of Bell's proposal: one
concerns Bell's metaphysically opaque presentation; the other concerns
his worry that TBM exhibits a temporal form of solipsism, which he and
others deem problematic. We'll address both points by firstly delineating
a more perspicuous formulation, and secondly by demonstrating that
TBM doesn't entail temporal solipsism. Bell's concern turns out to be
unfounded. To these issues we turn now.
3.2. Basics and empirical adequacy
In this section, we'll unravel some of TBM's central conceptual
structure by clarifying the status of its corpuscles' persistence. Notwith-
standing their lack of persistence in TBM, we'll argue for TBM's empirical
adequacy.
First, let's briefly dwell on persistence of corpuscles within BM. Here,
the GE fulfils a metaphysical function: it ensures the corpuscles' persis-
tence. With no GE, TBM's corpuscles are no longer guaranteed to persist.
Should this faze us? The worry splits into two components.
(1) The first revolves around empirical coherence (or “epistemic sta-
bility”): without the corpuscles' persistence, does TBM undermine
the reliability of its own empirical evidence (cf. Barrett, 1996)? To
address this worry, we need some conceptual preparations.
(2) The lack of persistence prompts a second worry: is the GE neces-
sary for empirical adequacy within BM? We contend that it isn't.
Persistence is closely tied up with the measurement problem. The
latter encompasses in fact two distinct problems. The first concerns how
to account for the determinacy (value-definiteness) of measurement
outcomes. BM achieves this solely in virtue of determinate corpuscle
positions (determined, of course, by the wavefunction). Persistence per
se is irrelevant for this measurement problem. But it plays a role in a
related, other measurement problem – the “Problem of Effect” (Maudlin):
“The result of a measurement […] has predictive power for the future:
after the first measurement is completed, we are in a position to know
more about the outcome of the second than we could before the first
measurement was made” (Maudlin, 1995a,b, p. 13).
In BM, the GE accounts for the Problem of Effect: it allows informa-
tion of the measurement to propagate into the future. As measurements
effectively (albeit not actually) induce a collapse of the wavefunction
(e.g. Dürr & Teufel, 2009, p. 175; Lazarovici, 2019), repeated (suffi-
ciently non-invasive) measurements yield the same outcomes. In our
interactions with reality, the stability and temporal continuity appear to
be robust empirical phenomena.
Removing the GE from standard BM disconnects the past from the
present. This threatens TBM's empirical adequacy: TBM appears to flat-
out contradict the aforesaid stability and temporal continuity. If thus
the past and the present are no longer connected, why are measurements
recorded at different times and places mutually consistent? Shouldn't we
rather expect, say, the datings of organisms in our phylogenetic past via
16 A few advocates of BM may baulk at this, due to their allegiance to the so-
called nomological interpretation of the wavefunction (see e.g. Dürr et al., 2013,
Ch. 11–13). It takes an ontologically deflationist stance towards the status of the
wavefunction: rather than representing a physical entity (what, following
Maudlin, we called the “quantum state”), it merely codifies the corpuscles' dy-
namics. The wavefunction's status resembles more that of a Hamiltonian or
Lagrangian in classical mechanics than that of, say, an electron. In that vein, the
wavefunction should be primarily understood through its dynamical role for the
corpuscles' motion. (An extreme form of this nomological interpretation is
Esfeld's quantum Humeanism, to which we'll come further below.) If one thus
construes the wavefunction nomologically, one will be inclined to reject the
ontological holism and (partial) dependence of the corpuscles: our above
reasoning for them crucially involved taking the corpuscles' quantum state
ontologically serious. That consequence worries us little. First, we regard the
nomological interpretation as (at best) an option for BM (or any other quantum
theory) – not a universally compelling stance towards the wavefunction (not
even for BM). Furthermore, the nomological interpretation has incurred
scathing criticism from various authors (e.g. Wallace & Brown, 2004; Ney, &
Philipps, 2013; Sole & Hoefer, 2019). We largely concur with their assessments.
Accordingly, we remain skeptical of the nomological interpretation. But, of
course, readers are free to adopt it: they can safely skip our elaborations of our
proposed ontologically meaty interpretation of the wavefunction as a holistic
disposition.
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For TBM, the question is thrown into sharp relief. The actualisation of
configurations is stochastically independent. That is, for measurable re-
gions Q;Q0⊆R3N , one stipulates that the joint probability factorises:
PΨðQt 2Q &fQt0 2Q
0 Þ¼PΨðQt 2QÞPΨðQt0 2Q
0 Þ
.That is: the actualisation of one configuration at some instant in time
doesn't affect the probability for another configuration at some other
instant in time. Accordingly, any link between generic actual configu-
rations is cut. All memory of an antecedent configuration is erased in a
jump. It seems absurdly improbable that both you and your spouse hold
consistent memories of, say, your childrens' names. Prima facie, TBM
appears to predict that our memories should tell of disparate pasts, more
bizarre than surrealists' paintings or Borges' City of the Immortals.
Doesn't this seal TBM's fate as hopelessly inadequate?
To glean how that danger is warded off, we'll avail ourselves of three
ingredients: first, to represent (for convenience) the N-corpuscle uni-
verse's total configuration in 3N-dimensional configuration space15;
secondly, to hone our understanding of empirical adequacy, borrowing
Barbour's notion of ‘time-capsules’; and thirdly, to hone our under-
standing of an empirically adequate theory's acceptability in terms of
empirical coherence.
In order to defend TBM's acceptability, it will be advantageous to
adopt the perspective of the N-particle system's total configuration. For
readability, we'll henceforth refer to the N-particle system as a whole,
comprised of all corpuscles in the universe as the totality of corpuscles
(TOC). On TBM's interpretation of the QEH, we stipulate, it's the TOC that
performs random jumps through configuration space. At any instant, it
always occupies a definite configuration. By implication, the corpuscles'
positions, too, are always definite.
Talk of such simultaneous jumps may sound a little mysterious: how
do the corpuscles “coordinate” or “synchronise” their behaviour? Two
responses are possible – depending on one's penchants for a meta-
physically thin or thick interpretation of the wavefunction. (We'll revert
to this topic in greater detail in x3.4.)
Consider first a metaphysically thin reading, for instance, a Humean
(e.g. Bhogal & Perry, 2017) or nomological stance towards the wave-
function, according to which a system's statistical behaviour is thought-
economically encoded or summarised in the wavefunction. On a meta-
physically thin interpretation of the wavefunction, that's all there is to say
about it; all further metaphysical commitments are refrained from.
Hence, the simultaneous jumps of the corpuscles aren't coordinated or
synchronised in that they aren't explained or caused by anything deeper;
the universe's N corpuscles positions at any time just are what they are –
and we can effectively describe them as a random walk tracing out the
amplitude square of the N corpuscle universe's wavefunction (see Fig. 1).
A metaphysically thick perspective on the wavefunction yields a
different response. From this perspective, a presupposition of the ques-
tion becomes important: that the corpuscles are ontologically indepen-
dent, and that therefore the behaviour of the system must ultimately be
explained on the level of their individual properties, interactions and
spatial distribution. Due to its peculiar nature as an essentially non-
classical system, the TOC and its constituent corpuscles exhibit an un-
familiar mutual dependence. On the one hand, the corpuscles are mer-
eological parts of the former. This compositional dependence is familiar.
Yet, there also exists a distinctively quantum, converse dependence: the
TOC can't be ontologically reduced to the corpuscles. Rather, it's holistic
in the following sense (cf. Esfeld, 1998, 2003): the corpuscles stand in a15 Albeit perhaps reminiscent of the move in Albert (1996) (anticipated by Bell,
1987, sect. D) we'd like to stress that we don't subscribe to any of Albert's further
interpretative/metaphysical commitments, especially concerning his “marvel-
lous point” or “super-particle”. Our use of 3N-dimensional configuration space
solely serves as a formal representation of the N-particle universe's total state.
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pervene on their individual properties and spatial arrangements. It
characterises the system as a quantum (rather than classical) system.
Empirically, entanglement manifests itself in the correlations in virtue of
which the Bell Inequalities are violated (see Bell, 2004, esp. Ch. 2,4, and
8; Howard, 1989, 1992; Brown, 2005, Appendix B1–B3 for details).
In consequence, from the vantage point of a metaphysically thick
stance towards the wavefunction, one shouldn't say that the corpuscles
(instantaneously) influence each other, when jumping simultaneously.
Such a causal account requires that the causal relata be distinct. That is,
they mustn't stand in any ontological dependence relation, such as
supervenience, grounding, etc. This isn't the case here: the TOC possesses
a property that doesn't supervene on the properties of its constituents16 –
the quantum state, represented by their N-particle wavefunction; in vir-
tue of it its constituent corpuscles lose one form of ontological inde-
pendence (but not all, see e.g. Tahko & Lowe, 2015). Therefore, the
corpuscles' simultaneous jumping is better understood as a fact of the
holistic system they form (rather than a mysteriously synchronised action
of independent corpuscles).17
Irrespective of whether one adopts a metaphysically thin or thick
interpretation of the wavefunction: the fundamentally random local-
isation process of TBM's TOC replaces the deterministic trajectories of
BM's corpuscles. The TOC's jumps are stochastically independent. The
QEH – interpreted now as a stochastic law – furnishes the probability
measure for this localisation process: the probability density for the
universe – i.e. the TOC formed by all corpuscles – to localise itself
spontaneously at Q :¼ ðQ1;…;QNÞ 2 R3N is PΨt ðQÞ ¼ jΨtðQÞj2, with the
universal wavefunction Ψt . In other words: while we keep BM's QEH as a
formal postulate, we no longer interpret it in terms of typicality. Instead,
in TBM, it takes over the role of an irreducibly stochastic guidance law for
the corpuscles.
(QEH)TBM The N-corpuscle universe (TOC) locates itself spontane-




d3NQjΨðQÞj2:17 That is, with this holistic construal, the TOC view eschews the interaction
(or “communication”) problem of the “two-space reading” of BM (Ney, 2012, p.
535) – the difficulty to conceptualise how the wavefunction (as an inhabitant of
3N-dimensional configuration space) can influence the corpuscles (as in-
habitants of 3-dimensional “physical” space). Note that any “two space” dualism
is straightforwardly avoided: there are no two distinct substances whose inter-
action needs to be accounted for: the TOC and the corpuscles aren't ontologically
independent entities.
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second ingredient – a more precise notion of what we are after: what does
empirical adequacy amount to? According to van Fraassen's standard
definition, a theory is empirically adequate, if the observable phenomena
can be embedded into it: “(T)he structures which can be described in
experimental and measurement reports we can call appearances: The
theory is empirically adequate, if it has some model such that all ap-
pearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model” (van
Fraassen, 1980, p. 64).
How does this translate in the case of TBM and its empirical ade-
quacy? For the moment, we postpone the question of how van Fraassen's
definition applies to TBM's probabilistic nature (and whether the given
definition of empirical adequacy suffices to make TBM acceptable). We'll
return to that particular problem shortly.
To gauge TBM's empirical adequacy (or rather: its non-probabilistic
component), we must heed what according to Bell was the (in his eyes
largely overlooked) “really novel element in the Everett theory” – “a
repudiation of the concept of the ‘past’ which could be considered in the
same liberating tradition as Einstein's repudiation of absolute simulta-
neity” (Bell, 1987, p. 118): “We have no access to the past. We have only
our ‘memories’ and ‘records’. But these memories and records are in fact
present phenomena” (op.cit., p. 136). Elsewhere, Bell states even more
clearly: “For we have no access to the past, but only to memories, and
these memories are just part of the instantaneous configuration of the
world” (Bell, 1976, p. 16, our emphasis). In other words: to save the
appearances – i.e. to achieve empirical adequacy – it suffices to be able to
explain why corpuscle configurations are actualised that contain struc-
tures corresponding to the records (in particular of measurements, but
more mundane “traces of the past”, such as a diary, a scar or a glacier)
and brain states involved in memory, abundant in our world.
Characteristic of such records and (non-pathological) memories is
that they allow for consistent causal stories. In TBM, a causal link be-
tween two arbitrary configurations of the universe evidently can't be had.
(In this regard, i.e. the absence of a causal link between configurations, it
resembles the GRW flash theory; we'll revert to the differences between
the two theories with respect to their ontology, what kind of primitive
stuff they posit, in x3.4.). With the aforementioned “novel element in the
Everett theory” – the “repudiation of the concept of the ‘past’” – this
needn't make us despond over TBM's empirical adequacy: it's preserved,
if configurations of the universe permit of consistent quasi18-causal
stories. For TBM to be empirically adequate, it must give rise to worlds
like ours, i.e. with the following two features (cf. Barrett, 1996):
(DEF) Measurement outcomes – and properties of macro-objects –
must possess sharp (definite) values.
(REC) Records, including memories, must be mutually consistent.
(DEF) is equivalent to a solution to the first measurement problem
mentioned in x3.2. With positions as its local beables, we already saw
how TBM accomplishes this. What about (REC)? Is it satisfied?
Barbour (1999, p. 31, Ch. 2, 3, 17–19; 2009) evocatively dubbed
configurations achieving this – i.e. configurations “that (appear) to
contain mutually consistent records of processes that took place in a past
in accordance with certain laws” – ‘time-capsules’. An example are
configurations that instantiate our planet. Its multifarious strata, fossil
records and rock formations, tell a mutually compatible, robustly regular
story with uniform structural layers: “The story of antiquity of the Earth
and of its creation from supernova debris – the stardust from which we
believe we ourselves are made – is a story of patient inference built upon
patient inference based upon marks and structures of rocks. On this rock
– the Earth in all its glory – the geologists have built the history of the18
“Pseudo-causal” would be equally apt, since the appearance of such causal
stories isn't warranted at a fundamental level (see x3.5). Thanks to an anony-
mous referee for stressing this.
174world, the universe even” (op.cit., p. 33).
In short: the standard definition of empirical adequacy requires that
in TBM amongst the actualised configurations there be time-capsules. But
the cited standard definition of empirical adequacy can't be the whole
story. It brackets TBM's probabilistic (statistical) nature. For probabilistic
theories, we must supplement van Fraassen's definition (as van Fraassen
(1980, Ch. 4) does himself): for a probabilistic theory to be acceptable, it
must be also empirically coherent (or: “epistemically stable”, cf. Myrvold,
2016; Carroll, 2017). That is, it must guarantee that we may trust our
epistemically accessible empirical data. Else, it would undermine its own
evidential basis – the empirical data on which belief in the theory's truth
rests.
TBM is acceptable (i.e. empirically adequate and coherent), if high-
probability time-capsules are TBM's empirical substructures into which
the observable phenomena can be embedded. Is this requirement satis-
fied? Prima facie, prospects appear forlorn: time capsules form only a
miniscule fraction of all configurations which the TOC could visit during
its erratic wanderings. (Recall: with every random jump, the TOC always
lands on exactly one, unique point in configuration space.)
This answer, however, overlooks that one mustn't naively count
configurations: they aren't equidistributed. The distribution afforded by
the QEH – construed in TBM as a probability measure – involves the
structurally rich wavefunction of the universe. In particular, it contains a
mechanism for the universe to ferret out time-capsules (op.cit., Ch. 20) –
decoherence (see e.g. Bacciagaluppi, 2012; Schlosshauer, 2014; Wallace,
2011).
Entrenched in the wavefunction is the decoherence-induced branch-
ing structure. The details are familiar from the literature on the Everett
interpretation; we needn't rehearse them here (e.g. Zeh, 2003, 2000;
Wallace, 2002, 2003, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b). Note, however, that
nothing extraneous is borrowed: Everettian branching is no prerogative of
the Everett interpretation. A direct consequence of decoherence, it's a
generic feature of any theory respecting the standard quantum formalism
– as Everettians are keen to stress.
Wavefunctions of subsystems of the universe, large enough to
accommodate observers, have the functional structure of classical worlds
– “for all practical purposes (FAPP)” (Bell). Corpuscles that occupy them
realise FAPP-classical worlds. In particular, macro-scale interference ef-
fects are suppressed in them.
With its jumps, the TOC traces out the universal wavefunction. It
thereby traces out the Everettian branching structure, too: with over-
whelming probability the TOC lands on a point in configuration space,
perched on a FAPP-classical world-branch. The latter is thereby actual-
ised: a FAPP-world materialises. Each such world is FAPP-uniformly
structured, admitting of FAPP-causally consistent histories. In other
words: the TOC has a preponderant probability to actualise time-
capsules.
This completes the vindication of TBM's empirical adequacy and
coherence (contra Barrett, 1996, sect. 4): due to decoherence, the TOC
has an overwhelmingly high probability to actualise FAPP-classical
worlds. They allow for consistent histories governed by FAPP-causal
laws. Historical evidence, including memories, contained in them is
mutually FAPP-consistent.
Probabilities feature pivotally in this defence of TBM's acceptability.
Its empirical coherence – our trust in the reliability of empirical data –
was vouchsafed probabilistically: according to TBM, empirically
adequate configurations with mutually consistent records are actualised
with overwhelming probability. But how to understand this reference to
probability? What is the status of probabilities in TBM? How to interpret
them? We'll sketch this in the next section.
3.3. Probabilities in TBM
In x2, we reported that in BM identical copies of a system reproduce
the same statistics – those of the Born Rule. To better understand this
result, we'll now state more carefully the QEH and its relation to the
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We'll then sketch possible interpretations of TBM's probabilities.
Let's first refine our terminology. A subsystem of the universe (i.e. a
proper subset of the corpuscles constituting the TOC) is said to have an
“effective”wavefunction ψ , if the universal wavefunctionΨ : X Y →C,
with X and Y denoting the configuration space of the subsystem and its
environment, respectively, can be decomposed as
8ðx; yÞ 2XY : Ψðx; yÞ¼ψðxÞφðyÞ þΨ?ðx; yÞ:
Here φ and Ψ? have macroscopically disjoint y-support and Y⊆
suppðφÞ. Subsystems with an effective wavefunction and negligible
interaction with their environment can be shown to satisfy the SE for ψ .
Recall that the QEH supplies a probability measure PΨðd3NQÞ ¼
jΨðQÞj2d3NQ on the configuration space R3N . In contrast to BM, this isn't
interpreted as a typicality measure in TBM, as we'll see presently.
First, though, let's see how this probability measure for the universe in-
duces a probability measure for subsystems. Consider subsystems with the
same wavefunction ψ . Let their number of corpuscles be M. The PΨ-mea-
sure, conditional on all environmental configurations Y that yield the same
effective wavefunction ψ , is then determined (independently of Y) as:
PΨ

Q¼ðX; YÞ 2R3N : X 2 d3Mx & Ψð:;YÞ¼ψ¼ jψj2d3Mx:
From this, a Law of Large Numbers follows: For any measurable set
A⊆R3M and an ensemble of n identically prepared subsystems with the
effective wavefunction ψ and the position (at time t) random variables
XiðtÞ, it holds that
















with the indicator function χXiðtÞ2A :¼

XiðtÞ 2 A : 1
XiðtÞ 62 A : 0 . The distribution of
corpuscles in sufficiently large ensembles of subsystems, each prepared
with the same effective wavefunction ψ , probabilistically approximates
the statistics of the Born Rule – that is,
ψj2. Via this Law of Large
Numbers, one can therefore explain why the Born Rule (for effective
wavefunctions) probabilistically holds in subsystems (Oldrofredi et al.,
2016, sect. 3).
This brings us back to the notion of probabilities in TBM.19 They
constitute the core of TBM's counterpart of standard BM's QEH: in19 At first glance, the status of probabilities resembles that of the Everett
interpretation (e.g. Greaves, 2006; Saunders, 2021; Wallace, 2012b, Part II):
according to both TBM and the Everett interpretation, it seems, all physically
possible branches are realised. In the latter this indeed is strictly true: all
branches are actualised simultaneously in a perfectly deterministic manner –
giving rise to the so-called “Incoherence Problem” of Everettian probabilities. In
TBM, the situation is slightly different in three regards – a difference that
(depending on how deleterious one regards the Incoherence Problem) one may
deem an advantage over the Everett interpretation. First, TBM is a fundamen-
tally stochastic/indeterministic theory (to be elaborated in the main text). Sec-
ondly, fundamentally, in TBM only one branch is actualised at any given
instance. (TBM's many-worldliness emerges at a temporally coarse-grained,
non-fundamental level. We'll expand on this issue in greater detail in x3.5.)
Thirdly, only at an effective level – for all intents and purposes – are all branches
actualised in TBM within any finite time interval (TBM's “indefinite world-rate”,
as we'll call this phenomenon in x3.5): this doesn't occur with nomological ne-
cessity – as it does (ex hypothesi) in the Everett interpretation; the actualisation
of all branches within any finite time interval in TBM is merely overwhelmingly
probable.We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this.
20 There exists a weaker notion of objective probabilities  “epistemic” prob-
abilities (e.g. Uffink, 2011). Arguably, they are compatible with the agenda of a
quantum theory without observer. For our purposes, it suffices to show that TBM
allows of objective probabilities sensu stricto.
175essence, it frees the latter from its interpretation in terms of typicality.
But we still owe the reader a positive interpretation of those probabili-
ties. With TBM aspiring to an objective account of reality, a fundamen-
tally objective interpretation seems most natural.20
Both21 standard objective interpretations of probability are appli-
cable, we submit – propensity and Humean Best System approaches.22 On
a propensity interpretation (e.g. Bunge, 2011, Ch. 4; Suarez 2007, 2009,
2013, 2014, 2016), probabilities in TBM quantify an inherent, physical
tendency (propensity/disposition) of the universe to randomly materi-
alise a certain configuration: The universe is irreducibly chancy. Such a
propensity interpretation lends itself to TBM. As a fundamental theory of
the whole universe, its probabilities don't depend on other factors. Ab-
sent extraneous triggering conditions, the TOC spontaneously jumps
through configuration space. The universe's propensity manifests itself in
the series of actual configurations. On TBM's propensity interpretation,
the universal wavefunction represents this propensity.
On the other hand, a Humean Best System interpretation takes
probabilities to be theoretical terms that meet the following criteria (e.g.
Hoefer, 2011):
(1) They satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.
(2) They are suitably related to credences (i.e. rational agents' degrees
of belief) such that the Principal Principle holds.
(3) They are invoked in the best systematisation of the empirical
categorical facts of the universe.
The “best systematisation” here is understood as the one that strikes
the best balance between simplicity, “fit” (empirical accuracy) and
“strength” (empirical scope).
TBM's amplitude square of the universal wavefunction satisfies those
criteria (1)–(3): the first one by construction; the second one due to its
empirical adequacy (via its explanation of the Born Rule, as discussed
above); and the third one due to its extraordinary simplicity. Hence, a
Humean Best Systems approach to TBM's probabilities is both natural and
attractive.
In conclusion: befitting a “quantum theory without observers”,
objective probabilities are possible in TBM. We'll not arbitrate amongst
the options (including non-objective ones).
Now the conceptual tolls are in place to launch into a distinctive
metaphysical feature of TBM – its many-worldliness. Before discussing it,
it will prove useful to present TBM as a minimally Bohmian theory in the
following section.3.4. TBM as a minimally Bohmian theory
We christened the theory introduced so far “Tychistic Bohmian Me-
chanics”. What justifies its classification as Bohmian?We'll now legitimise
this claim. To that end, we'll offer a metaphysically precise formulation of
the Primitive Ontology (PO) paradigm.
Our concern here isn't merely terminological. The section serves four
main purposes. First, it provides a metaphysically perspicuous charac-
terisation of the theory's ontology and ideology – in particular with
respect to notions of fundamentality and ontological dependence. Sec-
ondly, our results poignantly pinpoint the regards in which TBM differs
from the Everett interpretation and the GRW flash theory. Thirdly, by
showing that TBM can be classified as a PO theory, we seek to by-pass a21 We pass over frequentism for two reasons. First, its defects are legion,
rendering it not a particularly auspicious interpretation of probability to begin
with (see e.g. Hajek, 1997, 2009 for extensive surveys). Secondly, due to TBM's
many-worldliness, we expect a frequentist approach to TBM's probabilities to
face similar challenges as in the case of the Everett interpretation (cf. Wallace,
2012, Ch. 4.5–4.7).
22 The arguments we'll sketch below carry over almost verbatim from the
analogue case of GRW (see Dorato & Esfeld, 2009; Frigg & Hoefer, 2007).
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function realists and PO (more below), with the latter insisting on a
theory's Primitive Ontology status as a metaphysical conditio sine qua
non. Fourthly, as a spin-off, the prerequisite terminological clarifications
will in turn, we hope, help sharpen the core doctrine of that framework –
and thereby advance the debate.
Let's ponder: is TBM sailing under false colours? Is it perhaps not a
Bohmian theory? Prima facie, a glaring difference might suggest so. First,
the spatiotemporal evolution of BM's corpuscles is deterministic. TBM's
corpuscles, by contrast, make random jumps. Closely related is a second
issue, related to persistence: whereas BM's corpuscles exist continuously
(cf. Esfeld, 2017), TBM's corpuscles spontaneously (dis-)locate
themselves.
Both differences we deem benign. Echoing Bohm, Dürr and Teufel
declare determinism inessential for Bohmian theories (cf. also Oldofredi,
2020 for a recent, explicit case for the compatibility between stochas-
ticity and “Bohmicity”): “It is often said that the aim of Bohmian Me-
chanics is to restore determinism in the quantumworld. That is false. […]
What is ‘out there’ could just as well be governed by stochastic laws […].
[BM] happens to be deterministic, which is fine, but not an ontological
necessity” (Dürr & Teufel, 2009, p. 9; cf. Bohm & Hiley, 1993, Ch. 9;
Goldstein, Tumulka,& Zanghì, 2009, p. 11). In the same vein, persistence
seems inessential: qua their deterministic trajectories, the corpuscles just
happen to persist.
Following Dürr et al. (1995), sect. 5; see also Allori et al., 2006, sect.
6), a theory qualifies as Bohmian iff it's a theory about entities in
3-dimensional space that satisfies the following criteria:
(1) The theory's objects are corpuscles (particles) – rather than, say,
flashes, strings or matter fields. To them, all ordinary matter – cats
and molecules – is reducible.
(2) At all times, the corpuscles have definite position – rather than,
say, a definite fermion number density or bosonic field
configurations.23
Both intellectual fathers of BM, deBroglie and Bohm, expressly
intended it as an interpretation of standard QM, not an alternative theory
(cf., for instance, Bohm&Hiley, 1993, Ch. 1). This physical conservatism
is reflected in Dürr et al.'s third requirement for a Bohmian theory:
(3) It's fully empirically equivalent with QM. By contrast, objective
collapse theories modify the Schr€odinger dynamics. In principle,
this yields empirical deviations from QM.
Only with respect to (1) might one have non-trivial queries.
Compliance with (1) is ordinarily phrased in terms of the Primitive
Ontology (PO) framework (see e.g. Allori et al., 2008; Allori, 2013b,
2015). Does TBM fall under it? Besides being a purely objectively
interpreted “quantum theory without observer”, this would amount to
requiring that TBM be a theory fundamentally about entities located in
3-dimensional space that form the constituents of all macroscopic objects
of our everyday experience. (PO theories more generally aren't limited to
particle-theories: whatever fundamental entities – flashes, matter fields,
etc. – they posit, the only requirement is that they be located in23 Other choices for (1) and (2) lead to merely Bohm-like generalisations/ex-
tensions of BM, which – notwithstanding non-trivial differences – continue to
exhibit close similarities, such as family resemblance, certain senses of reduction
in certain limits, etc. (cf. Passon, 2006, sect. 4). It lies outside of the present
paper's scope to tackle the fascinating (and largely open) question regarding
inter-theory relations that underlies such a distinction: what are criteria for
classifying a theory that is sufficiently different from another (think of quantum
field theories and (non-)relativistic quantum mechanics) as the latter's gener-
alisation? BM and its Bohm-like generalisations would provide an ideal case
study.
1763-dimensional space.) It's a little obscure what exactly this (standard)
formulation of a PO theory actually demands. The reference to funda-
mentality admits of multiple readings (cf. Oldofredi, 2021, for an illu-
minating perspective). Fundamentality is an ambiguous notion that may
denote a number of distinct concepts (see Tahko, 2018). Most germane
here are two – fundamentality as a complete minimal basis, and as
ontological independence, respectively.
A complete minimal basis captures the idea of a foundation of our
physical reality: what the demiurge had to create in order to determine
everything else that exists. That is, a complete minimal basis is the
smallest possible set of entities – not necessarily restricted to objects –
that determines the rest of reality. An entity is then fundamental in this
sense (“fundamentalCMB”), iff it belongs to a complete minimal basis.
Fundamentality in the second sense (“fundamentalODEP”) encapsu-
lates a sense of priority amongst entities. An entity counts as funda-
mentalODEP, iff it doesn't ontologically depend on anything else.
Ontological dependence relations include grounding, part-whole re-
lations, existential, essential or causal dependence (for details, see e.g.
Correia, 2008; Koslicki, 2013; Tahko & Lowe, 2015).
This terminology allows us to formulate the criteria for PO theories
more precisely:
(PO1) The theory's stuff and its properties (e.g. mass, position, etc.,
represented by the so-called “primitive variables”) are funda-
mentalCMB for a complete minimal basis for material reality. In
particular, they constitute all macro-objects, such as ouds and
axolotls.
(PO2) The various elements comprising the theory's stuff are also
fundamentalODEP.
A comment on (PO1) is in order. It doesn't assert that what is repre-
sented by the primitive variables – stuff and its properties – exhausts
necessarily all of reality. Other entities might exist, such as numbers,
universals or laws; but they'd be immaterial (see e.g. Allori, 2018, sect. 4;
cf. also Allori, 2013a, 2013b, 2015). This doesn't mean that only material
entities are important. A complete theoretical description of the world
must also account for the behaviour of immaterial entities. This is
implemented via the so-called non-primitive variables, such as momenta
in Classical Mechanics. Their role is to determine how matter interacts
and moves. Advocates of the PO paradigm standardly take an ontologi-
cally deflationary stance towards such variables (cf. Chen, 2019, sect. 3,
and esp. 4). (A routine option is a so-called “nomological interpreta-
tion”.) They needn't deny their reality (only theirmaterial reality). But the
role of non-primitive variables, those authors suggest, is primarily to be
understood as incorporating the dynamics of primitive variables.24 For a
theory to qualify as a PO theory, no “thicker” realism towards them is
mandatory (cf. Allori et al., 2008, sect. 4: “In [BM or the GRW theories],
the only reason the wave function is of any interest at all is that it is
relevant to the behaviour of the [Primitive Ontology]. Roughly speaking,
the wave function [as a paradigmatic example of a non-primitive vari-
able, our addition] tells the matter how to move”.). We'll therefore take a
theory to be a PO theory, iff the theory, when equipped with an onto-
logically thin (e.g. nomological) attitude towards the non-primitive24 The context of theory individuation/identity drives home this ontologically
thin attitude towards non-primitive variables. Two theories, according to ad-
vocates of the PO framework, are supposed to be identified as physically
equivalent, iff they agree over all matters of fact encoded via primitive variables
(see e.g. Allori et al., 2008, sect. 4.1) – even, if they disagree over claims
expressed via nomological variables.We confess that we'd be hard pressed to
elaborate how this doesn't segue into anti-realism about the nomological vari-
ables, given a standard construal of physical equivalence (viz. as asserting the
same matters of fact simpliciter, cf., for instance, Ben-Menahem, 1990; Coffey,
2014; Read & Møller-Nielsen, 2020).
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below).25
(PO2) also deserves elucidation. As we mentioned above, funda-
mentalityODEP makes reference to ontological dependence. Which form is
relevant here? At first blush, one might be inclined to forbid all forms of
dependence. But such absolute/unrestricted fundamentalityODEP strikes
us as too austere for two reasons. First, it includes mereological inde-
pendence (mereological simplicity). A PO theory's stuff then wouldn't be
allowed to have any parts. This choice would throw out the baby with the
bathwater: it rules out the GRWm theory with its “gunky” (i.e. infinitely
divisible into smaller parts, cf. Arntzenius & Hawthorne, 2005; Esfeld,
2018) matter density. In the literature, however, the GRWm theory is
unanimously classified as a PO theory. To relax the demanded sense of
fundamentalityODEP – by restricting it to only some forms of ontological
dependence – seems apposite already on purely metaphysical grounds
(Tahko, 2018, sect. 1.1).
The ontological independence we are after should be especially tight:
a PO theory's stuff is supposed not to be “reducible to more elementary
notions” (Oldofredi & Esfeld, 2018, p. 11). Elsewhere, we argue that the
pertinent sense of reducibility is best understood in terms of identity (in
the sense in which the physicalist envisages mental states to be identical
to physical/brain states), grounding or functional role (in the sense in
which, according to functionalism, to be in a mental state is con-
ceptualised as possessing a brain state that plays the functional role of
that mental state). We hence reformulate (PO2) as follows:
(PO2*) The theory's stuff mustn't be ontologically reducible to entities
that are immaterial or not located in 3-dimensional space, in the sense
of functional reduction, grounding or (type or token) identity.
Two advantages commend this refined characterisation – i.e. the
conjunction of (PO1) and (PO2*) – of the Primitive Ontologist's core
tenet. First, it recovers the classification of the paradigm examples of
Primitive Ontological theories in the literature (viz. classical mechanics,
classical electromagnetism, standard BM, GRWf, and GRWm), as well as
of the paradigm counterexamples (in particular, the Everett interpreta-
tion, as we'll see in detail presently). Secondly, it captures what we take
to be the intuition underlying the pertinent authors' insistence on irre-
ducibility: in theories not satisfying (PO2*), what appears to be spatio-
temporally located stuff, really is something else, e.g. patterns in the
wavefunction. This mimics the physicalist's hunch that mental states
really are brain states.26
How now does TBM fare vis-a-vis those two criteria for PO theories?
That TBM satisfies (PO1) is straightforward. On TBM, the 3-dimensional
corpuscles clearly belong to the complete minimal basis. If now we adopt
an ontologically thin – say, either a Humeanistic (recall x3.3) or nomo-
logical – stance towards the wavefunction (in complete analogy to BM),
the complete minimal basis for material reality solely consists of the
corpuscles and their respective positions.27 They are fundamentalCMB.
Compliance with (PO2*), too, is immediate to see: just as in standard BM,25 With this slightly cumbersome qualification we wish to make our charac-
terisation of PO theories interpretatively flexible: it shouldn't be wedded ab
initio to one particular interpretation of, say, the wavefunction (as a paradig-
matic candidate for a non-primitive variable). Other – in particular non-
nomological or even ontologically thick – interpretations of the wavefunction
(such as a multi-field view, see Hubert & Romano, 2018) should be compatible
with a theory's status as a PO theory.
26 It's grist to our mills that Esfeld (2019b) explicitly seems to have this sense of
fundamentality in mind (albeit in a slightly different context), cf. Lam &
Wüthrich, 2018.
27 To preempt misunderstandings, we hasten to add that nothing compels us to
adopt such an interpretation; it's merely an option. That's all we need to establish
TBM's status as a PO theory. As we argued in x3.2 and x3.3, an ontologically
thick interpretation of the wavefunction in terms of a disposition is equally
viable (and attractive on independent grounds – viz. as a solution to the two-
space reading, cf. fn. 17.).
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TBM thus satisfies both criteria for a PO theory.
As a particle-based PO theory, fully equivalent with standard QM,
TBM consequently is a card-carrying member of the family of Bohmian
theories (cf. Barrett, 1996; 1999, Ch. 5.1 for a similar classification of
“Bell's Everett (?) theory”). Fine (1996, p. 249) encourages a bolder
conclusion: “At the heart of Bohmian mechanics is the wave function and
determinate particle positions, and perhaps we need be realists about
nothing else.” Indeed, TBM only needs two postulates – the Schr€odinger
Equation (SE) and the (re-interpreted) Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis
(QEHTBM) –whereas standard BM needs three.28 (This claim is, of course,
predicated on the premise that Valentini's agenda to dispense with the
QEH as an independent assumption in standard BM isn't successful, see
fn. 10.) We therefore don't quite agree with Goldstein (2017, sect. 4) who
touts standard BM as “[…] the minimal completion of Schr€odinger's
equation, for a nonrelativistic system of particles, to a theory describing a
genuine motion of particles”.
Our classification of TBM as a (minimally) Bohmian theory contra-
dicts Bell's own classification.29 Originally, he had proposed something
like TBM as a (the most?) plausible version of Everett's Many Worlds
Interpretation of QM (see Bell 1987, 1976).30
Before turning to the differences between TBM and the contemporary
Everett interpretation, let's dwell on the differences between Bell's theory
and TBM. Indeed, at first blush the two look indiscernibly similar. A
crucial detail is easy to overlook: the way worlds are defined in each. We
simply imported the notion from the Everettian literature. Worlds or
quasi-classical branches, then, are coarse-grained notions. Bell explicitly
rejects such notions (see Bell 1987, (B) and (D)), since they are “mean-
ingful […] only on some ill-defined macroscopic level” – a level of
description recourse to which, Bell prescribes, should be banned, when
defining a (fundamental) theory's fundamental concepts. Therefore, he
diagnoses temporal solipsism: having discarded the Everettian
branching-structure, Bell is left with isolated, individual configurations,
actualised at one given point in time – with no link to prior configura-
tions. (Such a link would come about by either an extremely improbable
random coincidence or by the Everettian branching structure. But since
Bell rejects the latter in the context of interpreting the theory's funda-
mental postulates, effectively all ties to prior configurations are cut.) In
consequence, he doesn't distinguish between worlds and configurations.
(Although he isn't explicit about this, it becomes clear in statements such
as “Thus instantaneous classical configurations x are supposed to exist,
and to be distributed in the comparison class of possible worlds with
probability |ψ|2” (p. 133).
While it's true that at the level of the theories' fundamental pos-
tulates, TBM and Bell's Everett (?) theory are the same, they differ in
their stance towards worlds: we (following the Everettians) embrace
them as real (albeit emergent/non-fundamental) structures; Bell jet-
tisons them wholesale. Doesn't this sameness with respect to28 Nelson Stochastics might come to mind as another candidate for a minimally
Bohmian theory (see e.g. Bacciagaluppi, 2005). It dispenses with the SE by
assuming that the particles' position is described by a (stochastic) diffusion
process. (A special choice for the diffusion coefficient yields BM.) However,
Nelson Stochastics doesn't fully recover the equivalence with QM. To restore
that, additional constraints need to be imposed, casting into doubt the claim of
its being minimally Bohmian.Two other candidate minimally Bohmian theories
are Sebens' “Newtonian QM” (2015) and Goldstein et al.‘s (2005 a,b) “Identi-
ty-Based Bohmian Mechanics”. A comparison with TBM would be particularly
interesting especially with respect to explicating the – prima facie different –
senses in which they can lay claim to being simple or parsimonious. Unfortu-
nately, this lies outside of the present paper's ambit.
29 To be fair, though, Bell (1987, p. 133) introduces his theory as “simply […]
the pilot wave theory [i.e. BM] without trajectories”.
30 By contrast, Daumer et al. (1996), p. 393; fn 13 distinguish between the
Everett interpretation and Bell's Everett (?) Theory; ditto Allori et al. (2008),
sect.6.
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are identical? Not necessarily: it's not clear that theory individuation/
inequivalence – whether we should regard two theories as distinct,
rather than merely notational variants of each other – should be based
solely upon the theory's fundamental postulates. Regrettably, there is
no consensus in the literature on sufficient criteria for theory
individuation.
Observational/empirical equivalence is a little controversial neces-
sary criterion for two theories to count as equivalent. But – what counts
as the empirical substructure of a theory is a delicate business. It's here
that non-fundamental/coarse-grained concepts might become important:
they, after all, delimit the observationally distinguishable from the
observationally indistinguishable. (This is particularly clear in van
Fraassen's account of empirical adequacy, and his overarching semantic
view of theories.) To us, caution seems prudent; we therefore opt for the
(tentative) distinctness of TBM and Everett's theory.
Return now to what, following Bell, may look like a natural identi-
fication – TBM and the (contemporary) Everett interpretation. This
identification can be opposed for resting on a spurious identification of
what constitutes the supposed essence of the Everett interpretation. As
we saw in x3.2 (and will examine more closely in x3.5), TBM's ontology is
many-worldly: it contains many worlds. It's therefore tempting to
consider TBM a variant of the Everett interpretation. But – albeit absent
in prime specimens of Primitive Ontology theories, such as BM or the
GRW flash theory – also some Primitive Ontology theories display many-
worldliness, e.g. the GRW matter theory (e.g. Allori et al., 2008) or
Schr€odinger's many-world theory (see e.g. Allori et al., 2011).31 The
absence of many-worldliness thus can only be a contingent feature of a
PO theory. (NB: One should strictly distinguish between
many-worldliness and Everettianity, i.e. the classification of a theory as
Everettian. Many-worldliness denotes an ontological feature of a given,
interpreted theory: the presence/absence of multiple, synchronous
existing worlds amongst the theory's (not necessarily fundamental)
ontology. Everettianity, by contradistinction, denotes a particular inter-
pretative scheme for quantum theories, based on the interpretative prin-
ciples paradigmatically invoked in the Everett interpretation of QM, as31 In fact, TBM is the Bohmian – that is, corpuscle-based – cousin of
Schr€odinger's many-world theory: the latter's referent is a primitive matter
density field.
32 Cf. also Wallace, 2020, p. 85: “what should we expect from an ‘interpreta-
tion’ of quantum mechanics? Here is one natural answer: we should expect an
interpretative recipe, a set of instructions which tells us, for any given quantum
theory, how to understand that theory.”
33 Although much work remains to be done in order to flesh out those prin-
ciples (cf. Conroy, 2016), salient features (exemplified at least to some extent)
arguably include: (1) the absence of additional postulates that go beyond the
theory's working posits (e.g. a preferred basis or the introduction of an ad-hoc
collapse mechanism); (2) a “literal” realist interpretation of the formalism; (3)
quantum probabilities as primitive branch weights, rather than disposition-
s/propensities; (4) a “wavefunction pattern ontology”: the wavefunction's fun-
damentalityCMB and, concomitantly, a structuralist/functionalist approach to
higher-level/emergent entities.
34 One of the essential points of contention between “wavefunction ontolo-
gists” – such as Everettians – and Primitive Ontologists lies in their respective
attitudes towards functionalism (cf. Wallace, 2008, x2.6.7).The former rest
content with the existence of an entity – viz. the quantum state – that possesses,
at some effective, higher level of description, the approximate dynamical
structure (functional description) of semi-classical objects. (cf. Brown, 2009;
Brown & Wallace, 2004). By contrast, Primitive Ontologists demand that one
must posit independent realisers of this dynamical structure – stuff, over and
above the wavefunction: This stuff instantiates the functional roles of
FAPP-classical objects. Furthermore, Primitive Ontologists insist that those
realisers live in ordinary 3-dimensional space (cf. Maudlin, 2010, 2012,
2013).Underlying these conflicting ontological doctrines seems to be a semantic
thesis concerning how abstract, formal terms are imbued with a physical
interpretation (see Dewar, 2017, p. 7).
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For Bell (1987, p. 133), “keeping the instantaneous configurations,
but discarding the trajectory, is the essential […] of the theory of Ever-
ett”. Most contemporary Everettians, however, will gainsay this as a
faithful reconstruction of their views (cf., for instance, Wallace, 2012b;
Vaidman, 2014).
For one, they refuse to postulate any corpuscles (or any other stuff)
over and above the wavefunction.34 In this spirit, Wallace (2012b), p. 38,
for instance, writes with respect to the standard quantum formalism: “The
‘Everett interpretation of quantummechanics’ is just quantummechanics
itself, ‘interpreted’ the same way we have always interpreted scientific
theories in the past: as modelling the world.”
In other words, the Everett interpretation violates (PO1): only the
wavefunction is fundamentalCMB for our material reality; 3-dimensional
particles aren't. Corpuscles  or three-dimensional objects more gener-
ally – only exist as structural patterns in the wavefunction. In this sense,
the Everett interpretation also violates (PO2*): all three-dimensional
objects are identical with structural patterns in the wavefunction. That
is, they merely have counterparts, playing roughly the same functional
role at some non-fundamental, coarse-grained, effective description (see
Wallace's explicit invocation of structuralism and Dennettian function-
alism in Wallace, 2012b, Ch. 2).
Contemporary Everettians will disown what Bell takes to be the
essence of the Everett interpretation – the commitment to instantaneous
configurations: Everettians explicitly forgo a preferred decomposition
into orthogonal states. Its detractors perceive this as a flaw – the so-called
“problem of a preferred basis”. Conversely, Pauli and Heisenberg, for
instance, rebuke BM for foisting an “artificial asymmetry” on position
and momentum (see e.g. Myrvold, 2003, sect. 3). In QM simpliciter –
with the Everett interpretation as a conceivable interpretation – both are
on a par. In other words: even critics of the Everett interpretation
controvert Bell's identification!
Let's also push back against another misidentification of TBM's
ontology: according to Esfeld (private communication), it's identical to
the GRW flash ontology. The latter's “flashes” (or “hits”) are elementary
events, the centres of the spontaneous collapse of the wavefunction. Thus
defined – absent a collapse of the wavefunction in TBM – the “flashes” or
“hits” have no direct counterpart in TBM. Nonetheless, Esfeld (2018), p.
173) descries a salient ontological analogy between GRWf and TBM in
the following: “The GRWf ontology of single, discrete events can be
considered as a particle ontology without the trajectories so that what
remains of the particles are isolated events in space-time.”
Underlying Esfeld's verdict is his “Quantum Humeanism” or
“Humeanism without intrinsic properties” (see e.g. Esfeld, 2014a; Esfeld
et al., 2017). According to this proposal, fundamentally only primitive
stuff exists without any further specified qualities – a kind of otherwise
featureless prima materia/ὕλη πρώτη, the different chunks of which are
individuated only via spatial (or spatiotemporal) relations. These chunks
or matter points lack any intrinsic properties. Mass, charge, etc. are
merely formal parameters introduced in order to account for the occu-
pants' spatiotemporal evolution. On this view, then, non-permanent
corpuscles and flashes coincide. But Esfeld's Quantum Humeanism will
strike many as inordinately radical (for a critique, see Wilson, 2018).35
To say the least, it's not the only option for an interpretative framework.
For those who don't subscribe to Esfeld's Quantum Humeanism,
discriminating between TBM's and the GRW flash ontology is straight-
forward. Events aren't things: our weddings and our wives fall (for better
or worse) into different metaphysical categories or kinds (cf. Casati &
Varzi, 2014, esp. sect.1.1). Furthermore, we don't take it to be essential
for Bohmian corpuscles to possess continuous trajectories: it's possible for35 One may even go a step farther and reprimand the GRW flashes – and
Esfeld's proposal with them – as metaphysical monstrosities (cf. Myrvold, 2017,
esp. 6.3): denuded of any intrinsic properties, don't they suspiciously resemble
Lockean bare substrata?
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reflects the corpuscles' non-classical nature (cf. Falkenburg, 2007, Ch.
6).36
To sum up: we argued that TBM is a bona fide minimally Bohmian
theory. That is, it's a position-based corpuscle theory with a Primitive
Ontology (in the most plausible construal of that framework) and
empirically equivalent to standard QM. We rejected both Bell's classifi-
cation of (his variant of) TBM as Everettian, as well as Esfeld's identifi-
cation of TBM's ontology with the GRW flash ontology.
Bell had already contemplated something like TBM.Why did he reject
it? For an answer, we must scrutinise TBM's many-worlds character.
3.5. Temporal solipsism? – Quasi-persistent many-worlds!
This section will rebut Bell's criticism that TBM is temporally solipsistic:
according to Bell, it's overwhelmingly probable that our world only exists
for one single infinitesimal moment.37 This diagnosis is specious, how-
ever: in any interval of time, our world pops into existence infinitely
many times – as does every other quasi-classical world.
As mentioned above, Bell adumbrated TBM (or something very
similar, with the key difference consisting in the definition of worlds, see
our preceding comment – for ease of readability, we'll here use TBM and
Bell's “Everett (?) theory” interchangeably). He correctly realizes that in
TBM configurations of the universe at two arbitrary instants are no longer
causally connected: “Thus in our interpretation of the Everett theory
[read: TBM], there is no association of the particular present with any
particular past” (Bell, 1987, p. 135). Despite conceding TBM's empirical
adequacy, Bell (op.cit., p. 136) deems this consequence fatal: “Everett's
[read: TBM's] replacement of the past by memories is a radical solipsism
– extending to the temporal dimension the replacement of everything
outside my head by my impressions, of ordinary solipsism or positivism.
Solipsism cannot be refuted. But if such a theory were taken seriously, it
would hardly be possible to take anything else seriously.”
If the universe randomly hops through the unfathomable vastness of
configuration space, at first blush it appears astronomically unlikely that
within our lifetime our world will ever pop into existence again. One
might hence believe that, according to TBM, we only endure for this one
single moment. Our hopes for any moment beyond the present would
then degenerate into illusions. Maudlin (2016, p. 324) poignantly writes:
“The Everett (?) theory [read: TBM] is a sort of physical blueprint for a
Cartesian demon, but one where the subject is deceived about the past
(and even her own past).”
What makes this (alleged) feature pernicious? Two reasons are hinted
at: first, it's supposed to undermine the rationality of our belief in TBM;
secondly and more generally, temporal solipsism is supposed to be
incoherent.
Vis-a-vis the puny probability that our world existed a minute
ago and will continue to do so for the next one, Bell demurs: how
still to trust our memories or anticipations of the future? Bell denies
that we could. Our quotidian practices, his argument goes, presup-
pose the reliability of memories and future anticipations. Therefore
solipsism, temporal and metaphysical, despite being irrefutable in
principle, is pragmatically unviable (in Kantian terminology: it vio-
lates a regulative principle): “It is always interesting to find that36 We thank Michael Esfeld (Lausanne) for an illuminating discussion.
37 We don't take Bell's main objection to be the inaccuracy of our memories and
records of the past: that they don't track the complete, real history as disclosed,
as it were, from the God's eye view. (We'll address that criticism later on in the
main text, too.) Our reading of Bell is, we believe, buttressed by his repeated
emphasis (p.133, p. 135, p. 136) on the fact that our only access to other times is
via present data, and that the inherent link to those times is cut – to the effect
(we take him to conclude) that we are epistemically trapped in the moment.
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p. 136).
More generally, Bell intimates that TBM's temporal solipsism, on the
one hand, and metaphysical solipsism on the other share the same
problems. Arguably foremost amongst them is that of incoherence (see
e.g. Thornton, 2004, sect. 4). In the case of metaphysical solipsism, in so
far as its articulated as a rational thesis, its advocate must resort to lan-
guage and logic. But the solipsist's arguments forfeit their intersubjective
force (and plausibly even their comprehensibility): after all, she disputes
that anything exists outside of her own mind. This vitiates all her argu-
ments ab initio.
The analogue of the incoherence argument in the case of temporal
solipsism generalises the concern about practical reliability of mem-
ories and future anticipations: if a theory entails that all the relevant
evidence in its favour is deceptive, on what grounds can we still
rationally believe it? Bell (1987, p. 136) likens the situation to a Young
Earth Creationists’ response to contradictory empirical evidence: “The
theory was that of the creation of the world in 4004 BC. […] The trees
would be created with annular rings, although the corresponding
number of years had not elapsed. […] The rocks would be typical rocks,
some occurring in strata and bearing fossils – of creatures that had
never lived.” In other words: According to Bell, TBM resembles Young
Earth Creationism in that it invalidates its own empirical evidence. Both
are therefore incoherent.
Fortunately, TBM can be salvaged. Bell's concerns about temporal
solipsism don't carry over: TBM isn't temporally solipsistic. What Bell and
other commentators have overlooked – arguably, due to neglecting that
worlds are a coarse-grained concept, see the above difference between
Bell's Everett (?) theory and TBM – is a peculiarity of TBM's many-worlds
character. It exhibits a “stochastically successive many-worldliness”:
within any finite time span, our world is actualised for (uncountably)
infinitely many instants. This ensues from the following considerations.
Let ðW ; t0Þ denote the event that the FAPP-classical macro-worldW
(recall 3.2) is actualised at t ¼ t0.






Macro-worlds are only FAPP-defined. They are coarse-grained con-
cepts. This translates into them occupying finite “volume” in configura-
tion space. Albeit tiny, the probability for W ’s actualisation is therefore
always non-zero:
8t2R : 0<PΨ½ðW ; tÞ ≪ 1:
Recall that probability distributions needn't have a well-defined
expectation value. (The canonical example is the Cauchy distribution:
it has neither finite expectation value nor variance.) Thereby, the
formulation of laws of large numbers is blocked. This is the case here, too,
as follows from the following simple argument.
Consider the compact time interval I⊂R. Defined as a function on it,
PΨ½ðW ; :Þ : I → 0; 1 is continuous. It follows that its minimum is non-
zero:
PminðW ; IÞ : ¼ inf
t2I
fPΨ½ðW ; tÞg > 0:
Now choose from I randomly N points t1;…; tN 2 I: These are the
(discrete) blinks of His eyes God is willing to devote to the universe
“below”.
TBM's TOC is memoryless (in the mathematical-technical sense): its
positions during those moments are stochastically independent. Hence,
the expectation value for W popping into existence at least one moment
out of the t1;…; tN is:
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fPΨ½ðW ; tÞg¼NPminðW ; IÞ > 0:
How often should God expect then to behold the worldW during I? It
depends on how frequently He's willing to peep. If His attention is un-
limited, so is the expectation value for the actualisation of W :
EΨ½W ; t1;…; tN  !N→∞∞:
In short: on TBM, our world ceases to exist continuously. Nonetheless,
in any finite interval, it pops into existence infinitely many infinitesimal
instants. This holds for all macro-worlds (Everettian branches): they are
actualised infinitely many times within each second – successively. In the
Everett interpretation, all worlds coexist simultaneously. By contradis-
tinction, in TBM each world is realised only one at a time, randomly
“selected”. The Everettian multiverse picture thus resembles an ill-
attuned TV displaying several channels at once. TBM's many-
worldliness resembles that of a TV randomly and rapidly switching be-
tween different channels.38 That is, the temporal order in which TBM's
worlds are actualised is random. (Recall from x3.2 that the TOC's jumps
through configuration space are stochastically independent.)
TBM's stochastically successive many-worldliness extricates the the-
ory from temporal solipsism: our existence isn't restricted to one single
moment. We continue to exist – albeit not continuously. Our memories
and future anticipations are reliable: they permit inferences to our macro-
world's history; within each atto-second, infinitely many temporal frag-
ments of it are realised. On TBM, historical records aren't illusory or
deceptive: they correctly describe a branch of reality (quite literally: an
Everettian branch – that is, a quasi-classical history). This isn't to say that
the FAPP-classical reconstructions of our world's history from those re-
cords are fundamentally correct. They are merely higher-level/emergent
descriptions.39 And most importantly, of course: there isn't just one
such quasi-classical world, but staggeringly many. The fundamental
picture is that of a stochastically successive multi-verse.
Quantum phenomena – interference experiments in particular –
evince structure beyond each FAPP-classical world. Being empirically
adequate, TBM is capable of accommodating those quantum phenomena:
On TBM, they grant us glimpses into TBM's stochastically successive
many-worlds.
In sum: we defended TBM against Bell's accusation of a form of so-
lipsism that renders it incoherent. TBM is a coherent many-worlds the-
ory: Decohered macro-worlds successively pop into existence for an
instant; within any arbitrary time interval each world exists infinitely
many times, with the exact temporal sequence being random. No longer
persisting continuously, we still exist “densely” in time.
The panels in Fig. 1 visualise this result. The first shows the concen-
tration of the probability density induced by the universal wavefunction
(yellow). For simplicity, it's assumed to branch only into two FAPP-
worlds. The other three panels show the actualised configurations of
the universe (red dots) from a God's eye view. The increasing number of
configurations in each picture is supposed to convey a feeling for the limit
process that leads to TBM's indefinite world rate. The frequency with
which snapshots are taken (or: “God blinks”) increases from left to right.
4. Summary
We started with a review of standard Bohmian Mechanics (BM). We
didn't question its viability and merits. Still, we proposed, it's worthwhile
inquiring into the consequences of removing its Guidance Equation: first,38 We borrow this simile from Allori, 2013a, sect. 4.4, who uses it to illustrate
the many-worldliness of the GRW matter theory.
39 Butterfield (2001, sect. 3.1.3) speaks of a “kind of coarse-grained surrogate
of history”.
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BM, and secondly, probing its (formal) eliminability is a prima facie
natural response to its empirical underdetermination – to be sure: not
necessarily the only option.
We showed that, based on the Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis and
the Schr€odinger Equation alone (with an appropriate re-interpretation of
the former), one can articulate an empirically adequate and meta-
physically coherent theory – Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics (TBM). Pace
Bell, we classified it as a Bohmian theory: 1. Its referents are (massive,
charged, etc.) corpuscles (particles) in ordinary, three-dimensional space.
2. At all times, they have determinate positions. All other dynamical
variables are contextual. 3. It's fully equivalent with QM. 4. All macro-
objects of everyday experience are composed of TBM's corpuscles.
While ontologically deflationary interpretations of the wavefunction
(such as the nomological one) are certainly possible, we showed that in
TBM an ontologically thicker interpretation is both viable and natural –
one in terms of an irreducibly dispositional, holistic property of the
whole N-corpuscle system.
According to TBM, the N-corpuscle system that constitutes our uni-
verse – the TOC – performs irreducibly random jumps through configu-
ration space. The TOC's (objective) localisation probability density is
given by the modulo square of the wavefunction of the universe. Due to
decoherence, it's concentrated over configurations in FAPP-classical
Everettian branches (worlds). During any finite time interval, each
world is actualised (almost certainly) uncountably infinitely many times
– in random order. Their ratios (almost certainly) match their probability
distribution. This guarantees TBM's empirical adequacy and coherence.
Although the worlds – including macro-objects such as ourselves – cease
to exist continuously at a fundamental level, in a temporally coarse-grained
sense they persist. At this higher level of description, all FAPP-classical
worlds co-exist. At TBM's fundamental level of description, each world
pops into existence only one at a time.
If TBM is a viable minimally Bohmian theory –minimally Bohmian in
the sense that it satisfies the minimal desiderata for a Bohmian theory –
one would like to know: how does it fare vis-a-vis BM and other Primitive
Ontology theories? This question must be taken up elsewhere, e.g. along
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